It began on 7 May with India bombing nine terrorist training hubs in retaliation for the bloodbath in Pahalgam on 22 April. That was meant to teach Pakistan a lesson—retaliation for the Pahalgam bloodbath on 22 April. But it escalated into a two-day drone war, with both sides targeting military targets, and both declaring victory. And now, both India and Pakistan are to sit down together, not as accuser and transgressor, but as equals.
Whatever may have happened tactically—and one must beware of the propaganda that abounds in the fog of war—this is a disaster for India in strategic terms. The country has lost face diplomatically, having been placed on par with Pakistan a quarter-century after claiming a seat at the global high table as an emergent world power.
This agreement to talk to Pakistan—something the BJP has repeatedly sought, even when Prime Minister Modi arrived there to attend the then prime minister’ grand-daughter’s wedding—has upended prime minister Narasimha Rao’s Sphinx-like ignoring of Pakistan at the peak of its proxy war in Kashmir. For five years, he did not even address Pakistan, leave alone engage in talks with it. No doubt he understood the great game that was being played.
Nor does the current government seem to be going into talks with the urge for peace through which that other great prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, actually wrought peace and an end to the proxy war—except that several major powers managed through treasonous factotums to reignite the Kashmir conflict.
Shimla forgotten
Not just that, the talks which have been agreed may dilute at least the spirit of the Shimla Agreement. For, US President Trump announced in a tweet that the two countries would talk to each other in a neutral space. Almost inevitably, the foreign minister or NSA of the host country will sit with the two countries’ representatives. That host might even seek to chair the talks.
Many of us have argued that Mrs Indira Gandhi—India’s greatest prime minister for strategic and security achievements—should have gained more for India from those talks, despite the animosity of the so-called great powers who supplied grains to a starving India in those days.
However, the one thing she did achieve is the guarantee that the great game would be kept out; Pakistan would not seek outside interference to try and resolve a strictly bilateral issue (regarding Jammu and Kashmir).
Every government since then kept that Agreement intact. Now, it’s slipping. Strategically, that is totally to Pakistan’s advantage. For, India holds the part of J&K that both countries want—the Kashmir Valley.
Mr Vajpayee proved a much more astute strategist than those who are now supposed to strategise. Tactically, Pakistan retained the advantage it had gained by occupying the heights in Kargil for several weeks in 1999. But, by instructing the forces not to cross the Line of Control, he gained tremendous diplomatic advantage for India over those 12 weeks.
The result: President Clinton gave Pakistan’s then prime minister a dressing down on 4 July that year. Pakistan was humiliated, and forced to withdraw. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif lost his job to General Musharraf, who remained an international pariah for a while. No one in the world urged India to talk to Pakistan. Rather, Vajpayee saved Musharraf’s face by inviting him for talks in Agra. Musharraf was so encouraged that he took the title of president of his country before going to Agra.
Great game over Kashmir
The irony is that Vajpayee’s talks finally led to an agreement on 6 January 2004. Not only did both countries agree to leave the borders of Jammu and Kashmir undefined, Vajpayee united all of south Asia behind a free trade area by 2006, and even closer cooperation by 2008. Vajpayee wanted to expand that trade, travel, and cooperation so that it would include a wide corridor including Central Asia and southeast Asia.
Not only would that have countered China’s Belt and Road Initiative long before it was announced, it would have been far more cooperative—not dominated by one country. A united south Asia not only had the potential to emerge strongly on the economic and strategic levels, it would have freed India of the `Kashmir issue,’ which so-called `great powers’ have used to hobble its emergence at the global high table.
A range of world forces, along with some traitors with influence over the levers of power, ensured that that agreement was brought to naught, that the conflict was reignited, and that India remains hobbled on the world stage. The Left and Right marched in tandem from 2006 on to make that happen.
The danger for the country in the talks which Trump has mandated at a `neutral site’ is that the same sort of major powers which derailed that peace might hope to gain strategic advantage.
Western powers, led by the UK in 1947-48 and by the US from 1949 to `58, have wanted a separate enclave which they could use as a base at the centre of Asia. The blueprint for this emerged as the Dixon Plan in 1950, was taken to Rawalpindi as his Greater Kashmir plan by Sheikh Abdullah in 1964, and was recycled as the Kathwari Plan by a large array of US Senators and Congressmen at the turn of the century.
It might well lurk behind the scenes even now. Meanwhile, of course, China has gained increasing control over parts of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir—and evidently wants to increase that.
No strategic thought visible
What has happened makes one wonder whether India’s (presumed) strategists went into this war after adequate strategic consideration of the geopolitical chessboard. While the first strikes against terror training centres made a strong statement, they were seen across the world simply as an Indian attack against Pakistan. It is a obvious that India’s vaunted agencies have very little ability to project their perspectives—leave alone influence over the media in other parts of the world.
More sobering is the fact that those attacks are unlikely to stop those terror factories for much longer than it will take to repair those damaged walls. So, if deterrence was really the objective, it is unlikely to be more effective than the air strike at Balakote in 2019, which helped the government to win the general elections that year, or the `surgical strikes’ which helped the ruling party to win the UP elections in 2016.
As for punishment for the Pahalgam bloodbath, perhaps more Indian than Pakistani civilians have been killed during the drone exchanges, and many homes have been destroyed. So, the people of India have ended up paying a heavier price during this process of punishing Pakistan than has Pakistan.
Meanwhile, the last three days have united Pakistan and refurbished the image of the Pakistan Army and its chief, Asim Munir, in that country. Before these battles, both were on the back foot, to the extent that Munir seemed to be tottering.
However, as the ceasefire approached on Saturday afternoon, Twitter witnessed messaging like this tweet: `It’s official now that Pakistan has won the war with flying colours. This victory will be remembered for ages to come. Pakistan Zindabad’
India’s air defences may have stopped more incoming drones than the other side could, but that is only tactical superiority—which Indians always thought their forces had. It is tough to make out how India has gained any strategic advantage.
Triad of challenges
The truly unfortunate part is that those in charge apparently did not even have adequate tactical clarity; they did not realise that they were really getting into a proxy war with China, and perhaps Turkey too. That was bound to give Pakistan an endless supply of armaments, fuel, and vital intelligence.
`A country only agrees to a ceasefire if it suits its national interest. Both agreed because both wanted a way out,’ observed Mohd Ibrahim, political scientist. He added that India should have been able to keep it going longer than Pakistan.
Those who are paid to strategise should have seen that Pakistan’s intransigent fight-back stemmed from the fact that it was backed by China and Turkey. They evidently did not foresee this when they sent planes in for those initial strikes on terror training centres. The question is: why didn’t they think of this line-up of forces before?
After all, it is clear to some of us that Turkey has become home to the current crop of Kashmiri azadistas over the past 15 years or so. And yet, the government, including diplomats who have been based there, have seemed oblivious—more focused on fashion than national security.
As for China, Pakistan has almost become its colony over the years. I first spoke of a triad of emergent challenges to India’s national security—Pakistan, China, and the Kashmiri street—in a lecture at Teenmurti House in March 2011. Gen Bipin Rawat later spoke of this prospect as a two-and-a-half front war.
But those who now dominate India’s strategic spaces don’t seem to be able to see beyond that frame they love—a `proxy war’ by Pakistan. This seems to be the result of strategic blinkers, and could even be rooted in a communal mindset.
But, as a host of patriotic men and women of goodwill realised over the past few days, national unity is of the essence, particularly in times of national threat.
So is a sense of history, geopolitical insights, tactical clarity and strategic purpose.
