NEW DELHI: Pahalgam is a watershed event in the lives of the new generation that is coming of age and now needs to man the ramparts of Fortress India. Setting the emotion aside, we have to avenge the killings and we must do so without remorse and without pity. The Pakistan army, with their government an impotent accomplice, have not only yet again opened a new chapter, they are fighting a battle for their own survival. They say a cornered rat is the most dangerous, for it will do anything for its own survival. The Kashmir card has willy nilly worked for Pakistan in the past for it gave an artificial, illogical creation the raison d’être for its very existence. Against a historical canvas, the Pahalgam terror attack should not come as a surprise, for the pattern has been repeated time and again ever since 1947.
The word that defines India in the Pakistani military psyche is ‘buzdil’ (बुजदिल) which is an Urdu word that means coward or timid. It describes a person who lacks courage, is easily frightened, and tends to avoid danger or difficult situations. The word literally translates to ‘goat-hearted’ suggesting a lack of bravery. Forget the fact that India fought back in 1947-48, walloped Pakistan in 1965 and tore them apart in 1971, in their mind the ‘dhoti-wearing Indian’ is, and will always remain, buzdil.
I was having dinner in Srinagar when the first bomb went off at the Tourist Reception Centre in the late 1980s. It was the start of General Muhammad’s Zia-ul-Haq’s Op Topac, that was designed to make India bleed by a thousand cuts, a term first used by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when he was the foreign minister in 1965. It took India a while to realize then that Pakistan Army had unleashed a low-intensity war using ‘non-state actors’ but once we did, the Indian Army, BSF, CRPF and the state police fought back inch by inch. Throughout the next few decades, the Pakistan government was careful to choose its words carefully, always denying its involvement, instead putting the responsibility for terrorism on jihadis and Mujahideen.
Whether it was Zia or later General Pervez Musharaff, human lives meant nothing in their quest to keep the Pakistan Army relevant. What happened to the Kashmiri Pandits, the Sikhs, even Kashmiri Muslims, civilians along with soldiers, para-military and police, was all collateral damage. To make matters worse, political parties/ families on the Indian side that needed to play a firm, decisive role in stabilising the state, acted as if J&K was a giant ATM and they feathered their individual nests, quite happy to play footsie with various separate so-called Jihadi groups.
I was screening my film, Baramula to Kargil, at LBSNAA on 4 August 2019. Watching my own movie, twenty years after I had shot it, I couldn’t help but feel how little things had changed on the ground. Pulwama had happened six months earlier, and as I spoke after the film, I said something had to happen to break the endless impasse that had held Kashmir in a vice-like grip for close to thirty years. The next morning news that Article 370 had been revoked swept across the campus and the country, and Jammu and Kashmir was divided into two union territories.
In the immediate hullabaloo that followed in the media, I was also asked to comment on the steps taken by the Modi government and I had declined saying it was too close to call and only time would tell how efficiently the Union government handled the situation. I also felt it was imperative that the opposition parties actually buried their partisan agendas and came together for the greater good of the people of Ladakh, Zanskar, Kashmir, the Poonch-Rajauri-Naushera region, and Jammu and of course for the greater good of Fortress India. Like so many others who had dedicated the better part of their lives defending Kashmir, one could only hope and pray.
In 1999, Kargil had taken us by surprise because the situation in the Valley seemed to be heading towards some sort of normalcy after the peaking of military operations in the mid and late 1990s. Like many others, I had felt that this time too the judiciary was being presumptuously stupid in calling for elections, for I am not too sure any of our learned judges actually have a clue as to what insurgency is. The changing dynamics, then result in the fiddling with the security grid, and since it’s physically impossible to cover every inch of the ground, you become vulnerable to a Pahalgam-like attack. With the situation in Baluchistan being what it is, the Pakistan Army was going to try and shift focus to Kashmir. Our Intelligence boys should have seen this coming. The fact the US vice president was visiting, should have also been a clear red flag given the escalation in terror attacks to coincide with these visits.
In the past, Pakistan has steadfastly claimed they had nothing to do with attacks on the ground. They knew nothing of the tribal lashkars in October 1947; nothing at all about Op Gibraltar with its multiple prongs coming into Kashmir in 1965 (see my book, 1965: A Western Sunrise) and Allah be Praised, nothing at all about the NLI and other units that manifested themselves as Mujahideen in 1999. Deny deny deny, was their mantra, and no matter what you put up as ‘proof’ subsequently, that moment of condemnation from the international community, once it is deferred, is meaningless.
But this time General Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah, the 11th chief of the Pakistan Army, has burnt the deniability card right at the very onset by extolling terrorist groups to re-ignite the fire in Kashmir.
The blood of the tourists who were in Pahalgam on the fateful morning and also that of the brave horseman who tried to grapple with the murderers, is on his hands. Whatever we do now, or do not do, is for the Government of India to decide. From the moves made by Pakistan, it is obvious all this was debated beforehand and it is but obvious that Pakistan will try and escalate matters. In their assessment, ‘buzdil’ India will make noises that will be mere optics, and a few limited strikes that will be done more for public appeasement.
As an Indian citizen, I have just two suggestions for our leadership to consider. First, declare General Asim Munir a war criminal; two, bring the Navy into play and without necessarily calling it a blockade, seal off Karachi and Gwadar completely. No ships flying any flag, will be allowed to enter or leave Pakistani waters. Hand over General Asim Munir and then, only then, will we talk.
Simultaneously, and this is as important, our leadership must introspect and see how such an event could have been executed with near military precision. The police and the judiciary across the country have become a law unto themselves, so much so that any victim today is frankly better off without turning to our khaki protectors for help. They say we never learn from history, but it is worth remembering, the gates to Fortress India, have always been opened from within. Whatever Prime Minister Modi now does along with the Home Minister Amit Shah, will determine how this country is going to go forward.
Shiv Kunal Verma, a distinguished military historian and filmmaker, who has authored highly acclaimed books that include The Long Road to Siachen, 1962: The War That Wasn’t and 1965: A Western Sunrise, offers a critical and nuanced perspective on India’s national security, emphasizing the importance of historical understanding, institutional integrity, and strategic foresight.
Verma underscores the necessity for specialized defense education and strategic studies within Indian universities. He advocates for the establishment of dedicated departments in defense and national security studies to cultivate experts who can guide military personnel and prevent the repetition of past mistakes in future conflicts. This approach aims to bridge the gap between military operations and strategic planning, ensuring that lessons from history inform contemporary defense strategies.
Written by:- Shiv Kunal Verma
